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AN ETHICS PRIMER FOR UNIVERSITY STUDENTS
INTENDING TO BECOME NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGERS
AND ADMINISTRATORS
Richard J. McNeil
Professor, Department of Natural Resources,
Fernow Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853-3001
e-mail rjm20@cornell.edu

ABSTRACT: Natural resources managers and administrators frequently face problems which have ethical dimensions. This
paper is intended to help students learn how to become more comfortable and sophisticated with ethical aspects of their
management studies, to learn to include ethical tools more in their decision making, and consequently to become better prepared
to manage resources later placed in their care.
Many of us realize that ethical questions are fundamental to our work. Most of us feel that we have an adequate understanding
of and ability to distinguish between “right” and “wrong” behaviors. But we are unable to discuss ethical ideas fluently and we
feel insufficiently well prepared to include them in public forums where management alternatives are discussed. A “primer,”
discussing and illustrating a small number of basic concepts and principles, will not make philosophers of us but it can give us
basic building blocks and sufficient confidence that we can continue to grow in our study of and our abilities to use those ideas.
For example, how large is the “moral community”? To whom or what do I have obligations? Aldo Leopold’s land ethic argued
that an extension of ethics would include the land; that is, we have moral responsibilities to other living creatures (and perhaps
to non-living components of our environment). In public meetings we hear it argued that all animals (and all plants, or some
animals only, or all nature, or rocks and waterfalls) have rights. We hear it said that hunting is immoral, that allowing deer to
starve is wrong, that any interference with nature is ethically questionable. If we can better understand, not just the emotional
depth, but logical, cultural, and religious sources and the arguments for and against these various positions and their ethical
ramifications, we will find ourselves better prepared to enter into ethical aspects of public discussions regarding resource
management, and further, to use ethical tools more effectively in making management decisions.
This paper discusses this and several similar fundamental concepts and illustrates their importance in resource management.

INTRODUCTION
In early June of 1958 a baby deer was left in a cardboard box
on the front steps of the Indian River station of what is today
called the Michigan Department of Natural Resources. I was
a wildlife biologist then, stationed at Indian River. It was
clearly impossible to return the fawn to its mother. Also, no
zoo or animal “orphanage” wanted more deer. Individual deer
had been raised more or less successfully in the past, although
this practice is generally illegal, and the adult deer then may
become a nuisance or a danger. It was generally agreed that
the fawn had to be killed. I took it into the woods, cut its throat,
and left its corpse.
When I tell this story to my freshman class of natural resources
majors, the long and relatively unsophisticated discussion
sometimes centers around the rightness and wrongness of
killing the deer, but usually focuses on possible ways to keep it
alive. When I encountered this problem almost 40 years ago,
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I was completely unprepared to raise or consider any moral
questions related to the situation. I very frequently faced (and
our students will face) similar questions which had (or have)
ethical or moral dimensions. Is sport hunting itself a morally
right or neutral or wrong activity? What about fishing? Are
certain kinds of traps cruel? And are they therefore wrong to
use? How should I deal with the information that I have
regarding a man who illegally kills a deer to help feed his very
poor family? Should “chicken hawks” be killed because they
kill the farmers’ chickens? Should bisons be killed because
they may transmit brucellosis to cattle? If we have reduced
predators by various human activities, do we have a
responsibility to replace them or their behaviors to retain a
certain “balance of nature”? Should the last few members of
an endangered species be captured in an attempt to “save” the
species?
I could have been far better prepared. And our students and
the public deserve that our future professional workers in the
1
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natural resources receive a much more sophisticated
university education and that professionals become much
better prepared to deal with ethical aspects of their work.
Clearly, all of us could benefit from fullblown courses in
environmental and natural resources ethics, taught by
philosophers who also understand environment. And I argue
for the inclusion of such courses in our curricula. Meanwhile,
I believe that it is possible for each of us to become gradually
more sophisticated and comfortable with this discipline.
I am not thinking of “professional ethics,” those questions
which arise as a part of my relationship with colleagues and
employers. (Should I put in a full day’s work each day when
my state government temporarily institutes “payless
paydays”? What is my obligation as a consultant when I know
that my client is behaving illegally? As a government
employee, may I accept gifts from citizens or from prospective
contractors with my agency?) These are important, but
deserve a separate treatment. I am thinking instead of the
ethical questions which arise during the making of policy
decisions and during the conduct of management practices
which relate primarily to the ways I treat our natural resources
and environment.

AN ETHICS PRIMER
I believe that each of us, whether faculty, other college or
university staff people, natural resources students, or
professional managers and policy makers already in the field,
with only a little help, can grow in the following ways:
1) increased confidence in our ability to deal with ethical
subject matter
2) increased ability to recognize and begin to explore ethical
questions
3) increased ability to recognize moral dimensions of and
analyze the positions of others
4) increased “mental fluency” and thus ability to participate
in public discussions over moral aspects of our work.
In my case, to the extent that I may have grown, it has come
from a determined effort to badger my philosopher colleagues,
participation in ethics-related short courses and workshops,
reading extensively, and having the nerve to step into waters of
unknown depth and write papers related to ethics. All of this,
of course, includes a willingness to accept the embarrassment
that comes, as every student knows, with trying to discuss a
subject with which one has a limited acquaintance.
This paper is not intended to be an ethics primer but to argue
that each of us can prepare his or her own primer by actively
engaging in intellectual exploration of the obvious moral
aspects of our professional subject matter. Reading, notetaking, attendance at conferences and workshops will help one
to grow. Particularly, I believe that the preparation of a
personal “encyclopedia of ethics,” with personally created
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/nrei/vol7/iss1/23
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definitions and accompanying descriptive materials can be a
powerful learning technique. Perhaps 30 to 50 concepts, with
a maximum of two pages devoted to each, will result in a basic
tool of sufficient scope to deal with many ethical questions and
at the same time not so large as to overwhelm one with its
content. This “primer” can grow and become more
sophisticated and detailed as notes are gradually added.
In addition, I have found that concept maps are an extremely
powerful tool which can help us to understand concepts and
the relationships between them. A concept is, according to
Novak and Gowin (1984), “a regularity in events or objects
designated by some label” (for example, see moral community
as discussed below). A concept map visually displays several
related concepts; one’s notion of the interrelationships
between them is demonstrated by the use of connecting words.
For each of the concepts in your “primer,” you should be able
to draw a diagram or concept map showing a few other
concepts and their relationships with the central concept of
interest. Novak and Gowin (1984) describe methods for
making concept maps.
Also, to ensure contacts with expert philosophers, it is useful
to become a member of an organization such as APPE, the
Association for Practical and Professional Ethics; ISEE, the
International Society for Environmental Ethics; or IDEA, the
International Development Ethics Association.
Finally, regular reading of a journal such as Environmental
Ethics will help you to grow in your understanding of this
subject, as well as providing a source for further notes for your
primer.

WHAT IS ETHICS?
“Ethics is a branch of philosophy concerned with morals (the
distinction between right and wrong) and values (the ultimate
worth of actions or things). It considers the relationships,
rules, principles, or codes that require or forbid certain
conduct” (Cunningham and Saigo 1990). Natural resources
ethics and environmental ethics are subsets of ethics.
Some Ethical Theories
Stewards of natural resources and of aspects of our natural
environment are likely to find 1) that they draw their own
ethical conclusions from more than one source or ethical
theory, and that 2) members of the public with whom they
interact in their professional work will also have drawn upon
several different ethical theories or sources. Generally, ethical
theories provide frameworks which help us to reach ethical
conclusions in some consistent, logical, and defensible way.
Clearly, it is useful to understand the basis of both one’s own
and of others’ ethical arguments. The following materials
draw mainly from Shannon (1987) in general construction
and some details.
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Consequentialism. Consequentialism, and its most common
subtype, utilitarianism, analyze possible actions by asking
“which possible action will (or would be expected to) bring
about the most good (or happiness, or pleasure, etc.) for the
most people”? This is closely related to economists’ ideas of
utility, and can be traced back to Jeremy Bentham (17481842) who was both an economist and a philosopher (Becker
and Becker 1992). A consequentialist might ask whether
certain proposed hunting or fishing regulations might produce
the greatest overall good for all affected people. Would the
consequences of allowing larger Canada goose harvests by
native peoples in Canada offset the possible reduced
recreational opportunity in the United States?

We are all likely to find, or to know already, that we use (and
that we “believe in”) one kind of ethical theory primarily. But
as we observe our own thinking processes more closely, we
may be surprised to see ourselves moderating our primary
stance by the use of a secondary theory. (I know that I am
supposed not to lie, but the truth would hurt his feelings
terribly.) And, as we continue to observe others’ choices of
actions, we can begin to see in their discussions that they are
using, individually as well as within a community, several
ethical theories.

Rule-based theories. Rule-based theories specify obligations
or duties, that is, they stem from rules. The “ethical act is one
in which I meet my obligations, my responsibilities, or fulfill
my duties . . . obligations and rules are primary” (Shannon
1987). Rule-based ethics often go by the awkward name,
deontological ethics (“deon” is Greek for “duty”). The ten
commandments are the best example.

As beginning students in moral philosophy, the tools that we
need at first are mainly a vocabulary and an extended
understanding of the meanings of concepts as used by writers
in discussing ethics. The following concepts are typical of
those encountered most frequently in discussions of, for
example, environmental ethics, and should present a short-cut
into much of the relevant literature. Much of the following,
where there is no citation, is drawn from Becker and Becker’s
(1992) Encyclopedia of Ethics.

Rule-based ethics tend to have a clear and certain starting
point but an insensitivity to consequences. I must tell the
truth, even though it badly hurts a friend’s feelings. I must
report the law violation by the deer poacher whose family is
truly hungry.
Rights-based theories. This set of theories begins with
statements about rights (moral, not legal, rights) being
entitlements to certain “social goods” simply because one is a
human being (or as we will expand this term later, a being of
a certain kind). One need not earn rights; they simply exist
because we exist. The claims of individuals are central to
rights-based moral theories, and it is common to find conflicts
between claims of different individuals to rights. Do you have
a moral right to cross my private property to reach otherwise
inaccessible public land? May I defend my lambs against the
depredation of your (our) public eagles or wolves? Do I have
a moral right to “more important” (e.g., subsistence farming)
withdrawal uses of water than does the city of Richville which
has a prior legal claim and is now using that water for lawns,
golf courses, and car washes?
Intuitionism. Some people (all of us?) argue that sometimes
we cannot cite rules or argue logically but we “just know that
something is the right thing (or the wrong thing) to do.” One
of the greatest difficulties we can encounter in a public forum
is that this source of ethical judgment is not logical nor
susceptible to rational argument or discussion.
Virtue ethics. Virtue ethics is a moral theory which bases right
behavior on virtues, that is, on dispositions such as “courage,
temperateness, liberality, magnanimity and justice” (Becker
and Becker 1992). Long lists of virtuous behaviors can be
created as guidelines for virtuous acts.
Published by DigitalCommons@USU, 1998

SOME SAMPLE ETHICAL CONCEPTS

Moral considerability. Moral considerability refers to the
questions of what people and what things have rights or to
what things we must give moral consideration. What things
can be treated simply as property or as objects and what ones
deserve to be thought of in terms of the rightness and
wrongness of our treatment of them? May I treat my dog or my
horse in any way that I wish, or must I consider their interests?
May I conduct classroom experiments on live animals without
considering their welfare? May I hunt or fish or trap or cut
down a tree as I please (within the law) and without regard to
the possible feelings of those organisms?
Some people argue that only human beings are morally
considerable; they deserve moral consideration; the treatment
of other living things is only a matter of our preference, not of
right or wrong. Leopold (1948) uses the example of slaves
hanged by Odysseus after the Trojan Wars. The slaves were
regarded solely as objects, and their treatment “only a matter
of expediency, not of right or wrong.”
Moral agent. A moral agent is one who has the capacity to
make decisions regarding the rightness or wrongness of one’s
proposed actions, and to act upon those decisions. A newborn
baby cannot make moral decisions and so is not a moral agent.
An adult human being living in a coma similarly is not a moral
agent. But note that we (who are moral agents) nevertheless
have obligations to those people. If I cannot act upon a
decision that I might mentally be able to form, then I may not
be a moral agent with regard to that particular question.
Moral subject. Today we almost universally believe that all
human beings are moral subjects. That is, the way that we
treat each other person is a matter of rightness or wrongness.
3
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All people have interests and rights, and they should be
subjects of our moral concern.
It is not so easy for us to agree what other (if any) things are
moral subjects and thus deserve moral consideration.
Moral community. Moral agents and moral subjects are often
considered to be members of a moral community. But how
large is that moral community? Besides human beings, do
other beings have rights? If so, which beings? (And what
rights?) Among the most frequent and most violently argued
questions which wildlife biologists, and to a lesser extent
fisheries biologists and foresters, encounter these days are
those over the presumed rights of other beings, and our
obligations to treat those other beings as deserving moral
consideration. How we treat them then is a question of right
and wrong based on their moral standing; they are moral
subjects.
How do we decide what are proper subjects of moral concern?
One common set of arguments stems from the respects in
which other beings resemble human beings? Are they alive
(do we need to treat rocks and waterfalls with moral concern?)
Do they have “interests,” e.g., to remain alive? Perhaps plants
qualify. Can they feel pain? (Are they “sentient”?) Perhaps
most vertebrate animals would qualify under that standard.
Can they think? Do they have intellects (e.g., whales,
porpoises, squid)?
Animal-welfare and animal-rights groups such as PETA
(People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) tend to
concentrate their arguments on mammals and birds. But we
have also heard the emotional discussions about classroom
dissections of frogs and other organisms. I remember very
distinctly the clear discomfort of a student when an instructor
dumped a seine-haul of fish before a class on the shore and
unconcernedly began to lecture while the fish flopped around
on the sand. I have before me as I write a wallet-sized card
with the photo of a round goby, an exotic species rapidly
spreading in the Great Lakes region since 1990. This
University of Minnesota Sea Grant card advises fishers to
“Always dump your bait bucket on land, never into the water.”
Are living fish moral subjects; are they members of our moral
community? This is, I think, typical of the difficult questions
that students and professionals in natural resources majors
will need to deal with much more frequently than we did in the
recent past.
Many people seem to include all vertebrate animals in their
moral community; legal rights are often similarly defined. For
example, at Cornell University “all vertebrate animals used for
teaching, demonstration, or research at Cornell (including
cold and warm vertebrates) are subject to protection by both
federal and state laws” (OSP 1997).
Moral extensionism. What we think of as the moral
community seems to be growing rapidly larger. Extending
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/nrei/vol7/iss1/23
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rights to animals is often called zoocentrism, and to all living
thing things, biocentrism. Some go further and speak for
ecocentrism, that idea that all of nature has rights, or
alternatively, that we have obligations to all of nature.
This expansion of our moral community was proposed by
Leopold (1949) in his discussion of a “land ethic.” By “land”
he meant not only the surface of the earth, but all of the plants
and animals, the ecosystems, the natural processes occurring
there.
Leopold suggested that stages in our ethical
development included 1) the personal (I must not steal from
you), 2) the relation between an individual and her community
(I must pay just taxes; I must participate in civic activities) and
3) our relationship with the land. Rather than seeing land as
only property and entailing no rights or obligations, we need to
see it as a community of which we are a part and which
requires moral consideration. Although Leopold did not
speak much of an international community or of the longterm
future, as an ecologist he surely would include them in his
moral community. Astronomer Carl Sagan would extent the
moral community still further: “The cognitive abilities of
chimpanzees force us, I think, to raise searching questions
about the boundaries of the community of beings to which
special ethical considerations are due, and can, I hope, help to
extend our ethical perspectives downward through the taxa on
Earth and upwards to extraterrestrial organisms, if they exist”
(Wilson 1997).
Many other concepts could be defined and discussed here, but
that is the reader’s job. Your primer will be different from
mine, but no doubt we will both include ideas such as rights,
obligations, autonomy, intrinsic value, reverence for life, and
many others.

MORAL DILEMMAS
Moral dilemmas (if they occur at all; some say that there is no
such thing) are situations in which there is a conflict between
two right things to do, not between a right and a wrong choice.
And the need to choose one action over another results in a
morally difficult situation.
Kidder (1995) argues that there are four common types of
moral dilemmas:
1. between truth and loyalty
2. between the individual and the community
3. between short-term and long-term interests
4. between justice and mercy.
Dilemmas Between Truth and Loyalty
I probably have no moral dilemma when my brother asks me
how I like his new necktie. I can gently break the news to him
with a minimally stated truth. But a critically injured mother
who asks about her baby’s welfare, when the baby has just died
4
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in an accident, may present me with a dilemma.

Dilemmas Between Justice and Mercy

I may have discovered the first cattle egret to be seen in
Michigan (McNeil, Janson and Martin 1963). When I went to
a university museum and asked to see some study skins, the
curator’s first response was to ask me where I had seen the
bird. Knowing that his intent was to collect the bird with a
shotgun, I refused to tell him (until a few months later); I gave
him only a general and perhaps misleading reply. This may
have been a genuine dilemma: did I have an obligation as a
scientist to reveal the location of the bird? did I have an
obligation to protect the only known individual of its species
ever to be found in the state from a would-be predator?

These possible dilemmas seem mostly to deal with human
beings. Examples in environment include: if we say that
animals have rights, how should we deal with sick or injured
and dying individual animals? Does the dying pheasant that
I find at the edge of a marsh deserve to be left alone and to die
“naturally” or to be killed quickly and thus to avoid extended
pain? Or is this a matter of no moral question at all? It may
be useful to remind ourselves here that many administrative
decisions and management choices do not include much moral
content. Extending a duck hunting season for a few days or
revising the boundaries of a big-game management unit does
not require a substantial moral inquiry. And moral dilemmas
do get solved. By our actions or our inactions we express our
choices; if we have been dealing with a true dilemma, it is
appropriate that we feel a little bit uncomfortable with our
choice of action.

Dilemmas Between the Individual and the Community
We all know of the classic cases where refugees are hiding
from a despotic regime, and a mother smothers her coughing
baby to avoid discovery of the group. If we have extended our
moral community to include individuals and populations of
wild organisms, related questions arise. Should we capture
the last few members of an endangered species in hopes that
captive breeding programs will generate a viable population?
Should wild horses be killed if they become so numerous as to
damage seriously the range where they are resident? Should
fish-eating cormorants be slaughtered for the benefit of trout
fishermen around Lake Ontario? Should individual oiled
birds be rehabilitated at great expense when those resources
used in different ways might have important positive effects on
habitat for the same species?
Some of the most difficult discussions between animal rights
activists and wildlife managers occur because the former tend
to look at the rights of the individual and have a limited regard
for the more abstract ideas of population health and habitat
conditions while the biologists thinks mainly in terms of the
larger units and tend to be less careful about the way they
choose to treat individual animals--the orphan deer, the
trapped coyote, the caged experimental animal.
Dilemmas Between Short-term and Long-term Interests
Deer hunters like to have lots of animals around. In some
places, winter feeding programs to reduce starvation have
resulted in long-term damage to habitat from overpopulations
of deer brought about by those “artificial feeding” programs.
Similarly, hatchery-raised trout and game-farm-raised
pheasants may provide more animals for our short-term
recreational interests but negative effects on the qualities of
the wild stocks of animals. The masses of snow geese that the
bird watcher loves to see in their wintering areas in the U.S.
are now causing longterm damage to their nesting grounds in
northern Canada.
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SOME SUMMARY POINTS
Regarding ethics:
1. There is no one uniform “god-given” system of ethics
to which all knowledgeable philosophers subscribe and
from which they derive their positions about right and
wrong behaviors.
2. Many people take and argue ethical positions without
much prior reflection or understanding of the implications
of their positions. (And they may not know that they are
making moral statements, or they think that they are when,
in fact, they are not.)
3. It is possible to start from quite different presumed
sources of ethics or to use quite different moral theories
and to come out with logically defensible positions which
are quite similar.
4. It is possible for two philosophers working from the
same moral theory to come out with quite different
positions about the rightness or wrongness of an act.
5. The world is complex; morally-charged situations are
complex. It is often a genuine advance to have simply
identified and considered the moral aspects of a situation
without unduly worrying about whether one’s decision is
the best possible in the sense of rightness or wrongness.
6. Genuine dilemmas arise and exist.
7. Some management problems and some policy
problems do not have important ethical content.
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Regarding how we deal with ethical questions:
1. We can all become deeper in our understanding and
more skilled in our ways of dealing with ethical
dimensions of our work.
2.
Personal work plus occasional consultation with
trained philosophers will help us to reach fairly quickly
and easily a level of understanding which will make us
capable of using ethical tools in our student, faculty, and
professional career activities.
3. A little patience and considerable humility are in order
when we discuss these deep and complex issues with
trained philosophers (who, alas, are also deeply trained
and experienced in, and perhaps genetically selected for,
argumentation). Their work is important, and knowing
how to ask for and use their help should be high on our list
of how to deal with questions of ethics.
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